# **Dunne, Cynthia**

From:

Carole Young-Kleinfeld <ctyk@optonline.net>

Sent:

Friday, February 22, 2013 9:07 AM

To:

Dunne, Cynthia

Subject:

Wilton Testimony for GAE Hearing Attached

**Attachments:** 

WiltonTestimonyFINALFeb222013.docx

Hi Cynthia,

Would you please distribute to members of the GAE Committee. Tina and I are not able to attend the hearing today.

Thank you so much.

Best,

Carole Young-Kleinfeld Registrar of Voters Town of Wilton Tina Gardner
Carole Young-Kleinfeld
Registrars of Voters
Telephone (203) 563-0111
Fax (203) 563-0130



Elections Department
Wilton Town Hall
238 Danbury Road
Wilton, Connecticut 06897

February 12, 2013

## Testimony to the GAE Committee—Public Hearing, February 22, 2013

SB 283 AAC On-Line Voting For Military Personnel Stationed Out Of State--OPPOSE SB 668 AAC The Training Of Poll Workers--OPPOSE H.B. No. 6111 An Act Concerning The Uniform Military And Overseas Voters Act--SUPPORT

Greetings, Senator Musto, Representative Jutila, and members of the GAE Committee. We are the two registrars of voters for the Town of Wilton—Tina Gardner (R) and Carole Young-Kleinfeld (D). We wish to submit joint testimony on the following proposed bills.

## S.B. No. 283 AAC ON-LINE VOTING FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL STATIONED OUT OF STATE.

OPPOSE—Lack of security, privacy, safety for voters and elections— As registrars of voters from the Town of Wilton, committed to protecting the rights of all eligible citizens to participate in secure elections and to cast secure, safe, and private ballots, we must oppose this bill. In the past several years, we have been closely following the studies, the debates, and the conclusions of those computer scientists at our top universities, our federal agencies, and our top testing laboratories as they consider the pros and cons of online voting through websites, faxing, and e-mail. Their conclusions remain the same today as they were two years ago when the Secretary of the State convened a panel of these experts to explore the future role of online voting for our state: that voting through the Internet is not secure, non-private, and is wide open to manipulation by hackers. The Secretary's symposium drew an audience of registrars of voters, good government groups, computer scientists, and legislators.

No audit trail for recounting or verification— Currently Connecticut requires recounts of paper ballots in close elections and manual post-election audits of ballots in 10% of our voting districts. With online website voting, there is no actual ballot to verify. With e-mailed voting, there is no way to verify that a ballot was not lost or altered during the transmission.

Practical Implementation Problems—Beyond the lack of security in trusting our elections to the Internet, this bill would present several practical problems to implementation—problems that could serve to disenfranchise the very persons that we seek to help. Some towns in Connecticut still do not provide Internet access for their registrars in their offices. Frequently, e-mail sent to some towns is rejected, because mailboxes are full or addresses have changed. In our town, our fax machine is located in a walk-through area between the registrars' and town clerk's offices, our main printer/scanner is in the main hallway of our town hall, open to public scrutiny. There is no privacy for an incoming fax or for printing out a voter's oversized ballot.

Current options work— Currently, CT allows military personnel stationed overseas or out of state to request ballots electronically and to receive their blank ballots by e-mail or by fax 45 days before elections. A special 90-day military blank ballot is also available from our town clerks for those in military contingencies. To protect the security and privacy of their vote, hard copy ballots must be received by CT's town clerks by 8 pm

on Election Day. This practice works well to ensure the timeliness of receiving ballots while also protecting these voters' right to a secure, private vote.

In the last election, registrars and town clerks worked with many overseas voters to get their ballots to them electronically in a timely manner, thanks to expansion of the MOVE ACT in 2011. We support the option for our military and overseas voters to request and receive a ballot electronically, but do not support trusting their returned votes to a technology that is not reliable and secure. In light of the recent hijacking of the Department of Justice's website by the group called Anonymous, the experimental and failed Internet voting pilot in Washington DC (<a href="https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/jhalderm/hacking-dc-internet-voting-pilot/">https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/jhalderm/hacking-dc-internet-voting-pilot/</a>), and national concerns over cyber-threats to our nation's security and communications infrastructure, we urge you to oppose this bill.

Certainly, those who put their lives on the line for our country deserve to be able to vote reliably, privately, and securely.

#### Proposed S.B. No. 668 AN ACT CONCERNING THE TRAINING OF POLL WORKERS.

OPPOSE—Current law requires pollworker training before state and federal elections, including primaries. We urge you to keep that law intact for several reasons. Election laws change, new election procedures are enacted, innovative training materials may be introduced, and different types of elections require different responsibilities by elections officials and poll workers. Because it can be several months between primaries and elections, pollworkers frequently need refreshers on critical elections laws. Timely instruction is a low-cost way to reinforce "best practices" and to ensure that polling places operate efficiently and lawfully.

### Proposed H.B. No. 6111 An Act Concerning The Uniform Military And Overseas Voters Act.

Support—We support this bill in order to provide military and overseas voters extra time for delivery of their absentee ballots which were mailed by Election Day.